We study the robustness of complex networks to multiple waves of simultaneous ͑i͒ targeted attacks in which the highest degree nodes are removed and ͑ii͒ random attacks ͑or failures͒ in which fractions p t and p r , respectively, of the nodes are removed until the network collapses. We find that the network design which optimizes network robustness has a bimodal degree distribution, with a fraction r of the nodes having degree k 2 = ͑͗k͘ −1+r͒ / r and the remainder of the nodes having degree k 1 = 1, where ͗k͘ is the average degree of all the nodes. We find that the optimal value of r is of the order of p t / p r for p t / p r Ӷ 1. DOI: 10.1103/PhysRevE.71.047101 PACS number͑s͒: 02.50.Cw, 89.20.Hh, 64.60.Ak, 89.75.Hc Recently, there has been much interest in the resilience of real-world networks to random attacks or to attacks targeted on the highest degree nodes ͓1-8͔. Many real-world networks are robust to random attacks but vulnerable to targeted attacks. It is important to understand how to design networks which are optimally robust against both types of attacks, with examples being terrorist attacks on physical networks and attacks by hackers on computer networks. Studies to date ͓7,8͔ have considered only the case in which there was only one type of attack on a given network-that is, the network was subject to either a random attack or to a targeted attack but not subject to different types of attack simultaneously.
Recently, there has been much interest in the resilience of real-world networks to random attacks or to attacks targeted on the highest degree nodes ͓1-8͔. Many real-world networks are robust to random attacks but vulnerable to targeted attacks. It is important to understand how to design networks which are optimally robust against both types of attacks, with examples being terrorist attacks on physical networks and attacks by hackers on computer networks. Studies to date ͓7,8͔ have considered only the case in which there was only one type of attack on a given network-that is, the network was subject to either a random attack or to a targeted attack but not subject to different types of attack simultaneously.
A more realistic scenario is one in which a network is subjected to simultaneous targeted and random attacks. This scenario can be modeled as a sequence of "waves" of targeted and random attacks which remove fractions p t and p r of the original nodes, respectively. The ratio p t / p r is kept constant while the individual fractions p t and p r approach zero. After some time ͑after m waves of random and targeted attacks͒ the network will become disconnected; at this point a fraction f c = m͑p t + p r ͒ of the nodes has been removed. This f c characterizes the network robustness. The larger f c , the more robust the network is. We propose in this Brief Report a mathematical approach to study such simultaneous attacks and find the optimal network design one which maximizes f c . In our optimization analysis, we compare the robustness of networks which have the same "cost" of construction and maintenance, where we define cost to be proportional to the average degree ͗k͘ of all the nodes in the network.
We study mainly two types of random networks. ͑i͒ Scale-free networks. Many real world computer, social, biological, and other types of networks have been found to be scale free; i.e., they exhibit degree distributions of the form P͑k͒ϳk − ͓9-17͔. For large scale-free networks with exponent less than 3, for random attacks essentially all nodes must be removed for the network to become disconnected ͓3,4͔. On the other hand, because the scale-free distribution has a long power-law tail ͑i.e., hubs with large degree͒, the scale-free networks are very vulnerable with respect to targeted attack ͓5͔.
͑ii͒ Networks with bimodal degree distributions. For resilience to single random or single targeted attacks, certain bimodal distributions are superior to any other network ͓7,8͔. Here we ask if these networks are also most resilient to multiple waves of both random and targeted attacks.
We present the following argument that suggests that the degree distribution which optimizes f c is a bimodal distribution in which a fraction r of the nodes has degree
and the remainder has degree k 1 = 1, and we show that r is of the order of p t / p r . To optimize against random removal, we maximize the quantity ϵ͗k 2 ͘ / ͗k͘, since for random removal the threshold is ͓3͔
Since we keep ͗k͘ fixed, is just the variance of the degree distribution and is maximized for a bimodal distribution in which the lower-degree nodes have the smallest possible degree k 1 = 1 and the higher-degree nodes have the highest possible degree consistent with keeping ͗k͘ fixed, k 2 = ͑͗k͘ −1 + r͒ / r. Thus, k 2 is maximized when r assumes its smallest possible value, r =1/N. On the other hand, if all of the highdegree nodes are removed by targeted attacks, the network will be very vulnerable to random attack. So we want to delay as long as possible the situation in which all of the high-degree nodes are removed by targeted attacks-which argues for not choosing r as small as possible but choosing r such that some high-connectivity nodes remain as long as there are some low-connectivity nodes. Such a condition is achieved when r is of the order of p t / p r . The method we employ for determining the threshold makes use of the following: the general condition for a random network to be globally connected is ͓3,5,6͔ *Electronic address: toshi@argento.bu.edu
Random removal of a fraction p r of nodes from a network with degree distribution P 0 ͑k͒ results in a new degree distribution ͓3͔
where K is the upper cutoff of the degree distribution. Targeted removal of a fraction p t of the highest-degree nodes reduces the value of upper cutoff K to K , which is implicitly determined by the equation
The removal of high degree nodes causes another effect.
Since the links that lead to removed nodes are eliminated, the degree distribution also changes. This effect is equivalent to the random removal of a fraction of p nodes where
The average ͗k͘ 0 is taken over the degree distribution before the removal of nodes ͓5͔. Equation ͑4͒ with p r replaced by p can then be used to calculate the effect of the link removal. Starting with a certain initial degree distribution, we recursively calculate P͑k͒, alternating between random and targeted attack using Eqs. ͑4͒-͑6͒, and calculate after each wave of attacks. When Ͻ 2 global connectivity is lost and f c = m͑p r + p t ͒ where m is the number of waves of attacks performed. We begin our study by first establishing numerically that, for small values of p t , p r , and p t / p r , the threshold f c depends only on p t / p r . In Fig. 1͑a͒ , we plot the threshold f c of a network with a bimodal degree distribution with ͗k͘ = 3 for various values of p r and r as a function of the ratio p t / p r . The collapse of the plots with the same r but different p r shows that the values of threshold are essentially independent of the value of p r itself but depend only on the ratio p t / p r .
1
In Fig. 1͑b͒ we plot f c against the scaled variable r / ͑p t / p r ͒. We see that the plots for different values of r collapse, indicating that only the scaled variable r / ͑p t / p r ͒ is relevant.
2
Next we study the dependence of f c on k 2 . As seen in Fig.  2 , as expected the maximum values of f c for various values of p t / p r are obtained when k 2 is maximum ͓i.e., when k 1 = 1; see Eq. ͑1͒.͔.
We are now in a position to determine the value of r which optimizes f c , r opt . In Fig. 3 , we plot f c as a function of the scaled parameter r / ͑p t / p r ͒ with k 2 set to the maximum 1 A similar dependence on only p t / p r is also found in other network types including scale free.
2 Similar results are obtained for other values of ͗k͘.
FIG. 1. ͑a͒
The threshold f c of three bimodal networks with ͗k͘ = 3, with ͑i͒ r =2ϫ 10 −3 and k 2 = 200, ͑ii͒ r =5ϫ 10 −3 and k 2 = 90, and ͑iii͒ r =10 −2 and k 2 = 50. The results are plotted as a function of the ratio p t / p r for three fixed values of p r . These plots show that the values of the threshold are dependent only on the ratio p t / p r and independent of the value of p r itself. ͑b͒ Scaled plot of the data in ͑a͒. The data show that the plots collapse in the region where r / ͑p t / p r ͒ Շ 1. 
FIG. 2. The threshold

͑7͒
within the range of our calculation. For larger values of p t / p r , r opt = 1 and from Eq. ͑1͒ all nodes have degree ͗k͘. In Fig. 4 , we plot the values of the optimal threshold f c opt by a thick solid curve.
In Fig. 4 we also plot the values of the threshold f c for the same bimodal network but we fix r independent of p t / p r . We see that these configurations are not significantly less robust than the optimal configuration. Thus, even if we do not know the ratio p t / p r exactly, we can design networks which will be relatively robust. For example, the bimodal network with r = 0.03 is relatively robust for p t / p r Շ 0.1 and the bimodal network with r = 0.09 is robust for p t / p r Շ 1. Also plotted in Fig. 4 is the optimal scale-free network with ͗k͘ = 3. We see that the optimal bimodal network is more robust than the optimal scale-free network and we can even pick a configuration with fixed r ͑e.g., r = 0.03͒ which is more robust than the optimal scale-free network in most ranges of p t / p r .
In Fig. 5 we show a typical optimal realization of a bimodal network. The network of N = 100 nodes consists of rN nodes with k = k 2 ͑"hubs"͒ which are highly connected among themselves; the nodes of single degree are each connected to one of these hubs. We note that while the hubs are highly connected among themselves, they do not form a complete graph-every hub is not connected to every other hub. For larger N, the fraction of hubs to which a given hub connects decreases but the robustness of the network is unchanged.
In summary, we have provided a qualitative argument and numerical results which indicate that the most robust network to multiple waves of targeted and random attacks has a bimodal degree distribution with a fraction r of the nodes having degree k 2 = ͑͗k͘ −1+r͒ / r and the remainder of the nodes having degree 1. The optimal value of r is approximately 1.7 ͑p t / p r ͒ for p t / p r Ӷ 1. For larger values of p t / p r , the optimal value of r is 1 and all nodes have degree ͗k͘. Even if p t / p r is not known exactly, a value of r can be chosen which maximizes the network robustness over a wide range of values of p t / p r , as seen in Fig. 4 . Of course, there are other quantities which one may want to optimize in ad- dition to network robustness ͑e.g., shortest paths, flow, etc.͒. This work provides the conceptual structure in which these optimizations can be performed.
We note that while the optimal distribution found here and that found in Ref. ͓8͔ are both bimodal, the values of the parameters characterizing these distributions are different. As found in Ref. ͓8͔ the network with optimal resilience to either random or targeted attack has r =1/N and k 2 ϳ r −2/3 . Finally, we note that it is possible to prove analytically that for the case in which a single targeted attack followed by a single random attack results in the network becoming disconnected, the optimal distribution is also bimodal with k 1 =1, k 2 = ͑͗k͘ −1+r͒ / r and r of the order of p t / p r , 3 supporting the results found here for multiple waves of attacks.
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